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Abstract: We assess climate impacts of global warming
using ongoing observations and paleoclimate data. We
use Earth’s measured energy imbalance, paleoclimate
data, and simple representations of the global carbon
cycle and temperature to define emission reductions
needed to stabilize climate and avoid potentially disas-
trous impacts on today’s young people, future genera-
tions, and nature. A cumulative industrial-era limit of
,500 GtC fossil fuel emissions and 100 GtC storage in the
biosphere and soil would keep climate close to the
Holocene range to which humanity and other species are
adapted. Cumulative emissions of ,1000 GtC, sometimes
associated with 2uC global warming, would spur ‘‘slow’’
feedbacks and eventual warming of 3–4uC with disastrous
consequences. Rapid emissions reduction is required to
restore Earth’s energy balance and avoid ocean heat
uptake that would practically guarantee irreversible
effects. Continuation of high fossil fuel emissions, given
current knowledge of the consequences, would be an act
of extraordinary witting intergenerational injustice. Re-
sponsible policymaking requires a rising price on carbon
emissions that would preclude emissions from most
remaining coal and unconventional fossil fuels and phase
down emissions from conventional fossil fuels.
Introduction
Humans are now the main cause of changes of Earth’s
atmospheric composition and thus the drive for future climate
change [1]. The principal climate forcing, defined as an imposed
change of planetary energy balance [1–2], is increasing carbon
dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel emissions, much of which will
remain in the atmosphere for millennia [1,3]. The climate
response to this forcing and society’s response to climate change
are complicated by the system’s inertia, mainly due to the ocean
and the ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica together with the
long residence time of fossil fuel carbon in the climate system. The
inertia causes climate to appear to respond slowly to this human-
made forcing, but further long-lasting responses can be locked in.
More than 170 nations have agreed on the need to limit fossil
fuel emissions to avoid dangerous human-made climate change, as
formalized in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change [6]. However, the stark reality is that global emissions
have accelerated (Fig. 1) and new efforts are underway to
massively expand fossil fuel extraction [7–9] by drilling to
increasing ocean depths and into the Arctic, squeezing oil from
tar sands and tar shale, hydro-fracking to expand extraction of
natural gas, developing exploitation of methane hydrates, and
mining of coal via mountaintop removal and mechanized long-
wall mining. The growth rate of fossil fuel emissions increased
from 1.5%/year during 1980–2000 to 3%/year in 2000–2012,
mainly because of increased coal use [4–5].
The Framework Convention [6] does not define a dangerous
level for global warming or an emissions limit for fossil fuels. The
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European Union in 1996 proposed to limit global warming to 2uC
relative to pre-industrial times [10], based partly on evidence that
many ecosystems are at risk with larger climate change. The 2uC
target was reaffirmed in the 2009 ‘‘Copenhagen Accord’’
emerging from the 15th Conference of the Parties of the
Framework Convention [11], with specific language ‘‘We agree
that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to
science, as documented in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in
global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius…’’.
A global warming target is converted to a fossil fuel emissions
target with the help of global climate-carbon-cycle models, which
reveal that eventual warming depends on cumulative carbon
emissions, not on the temporal history of emissions [12]. The
emission limit depends on climate sensitivity, but central estimates
[12–13], including those in the upcoming Fifth Assessment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [14], are that a 2uC
global warming limit implies a cumulative carbon emissions limit
of the order of 1000 GtC. In comparing carbon emissions, note
that some authors emphasize the sum of fossil fuel and
deforestation carbon. We bookkeep fossil fuel and deforestation
carbon separately, because the larger fossil fuel term is known
more accurately and this carbon stays in the climate system for
hundreds of thousands of years. Thus fossil fuel carbon is the
crucial human input that must be limited. Deforestation carbon is
more uncertain and potentially can be offset on the century time
scale by storage in the biosphere, including the soil, via
reforestation and improved agricultural and forestry practices.
There are sufficient fossil fuel resources to readily supply 1000
GtC, as fossil fuel emissions to date (370 GtC) are only a small
fraction of potential emissions from known reserves and potentially
recoverable resources (Fig. 2). Although there are uncertainties in
reserves and resources, ongoing fossil fuel subsidies and continuing
technological advances ensure that more and more of these fuels
will be economically recoverable. As we will show, Earth’s
paleoclimate record makes it clear that the CO2 produced by
burning all or most of these fossil fuels would lead to a very
different planet than the one that humanity knows.
Our evaluation of a fossil fuel emissions limit is not based on
climate models but rather on observational evidence of global
climate change as a function of global temperature and on the fact
that climate stabilization requires long-term planetary energy
balance. We use measured global temperature and Earth’s
measured energy imbalance to determine the atmospheric CO2
level required to stabilize climate at today’s global temperature,
which is near the upper end of the global temperature range in the
current interglacial period (the Holocene). We then examine
climate impacts during the past few decades of global warming
and in paleoclimate records including the Eemian period,
concluding that there are already clear indications of undesirable
impacts at the current level of warming and that 2uC warming
would have major deleterious consequences. We use simple
representations of the carbon cycle and global temperature,
consistent with observations, to simulate transient global temper-
ature and assess carbon emission scenarios that could keep global
climate near the Holocene range. Finally, we discuss likely over-
shooting of target emissions, the potential for carbon extraction
from the atmosphere, and implications for energy and economic
policies, as well as intergenerational justice.
Global Temperature and Earth’s Energy Balance
Global temperature and Earth’s energy imbalance provide our
most useful measuring sticks for quantifying global climate change
and the changes of global climate forcings that would be required
to stabilize global climate. Thus we must first quantify knowledge
of these quantities.
Temperature
Temperature change in the past century (Fig. 3; update of figures
in [16]) includes unforced variability and forced climate change.
The long-term global warming trend is predominantly a forced
climate change caused by increased human-made atmospheric
gases, mainly CO2 [1]. Increase of ‘‘greenhouse’’ gases such as CO2
has little effect on incoming sunlight but makes the atmosphere
more opaque at infrared wavelengths, causing infrared (heat)
radiation to space to emerge from higher, colder levels, which thus
reduces infrared radiation to space. The resulting planetary energy
imbalance, absorbed solar energy exceeding heat emitted to space,
causes Earth to warm. Observations, discussed below, confirm that
Earth is now substantially out of energy balance, so the long-term
warming will continue.
Figure 1. CO2 annual emissions from fossil fuel use and cement manufacture, based on data of British Petroleum [4] concatenated
with data of Boden et al. [5]. (A) is log scale and (B) is linear.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g001
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Global temperature appears to have leveled off since 1998 (Fig.
3a). That plateau is partly an illusion due to the 1998 global
temperature spike caused by the El Niño of the century that year.
The 11-year (132-month) running mean temperature (Fig. 3b)
shows only a moderate decline of the warming rate. The 11-year
averaging period minimizes the effect of variability due to the 10–
12 year periodicity of solar irradiance as well as irregular El Niño/
La Niña warming/cooling in the tropical Pacific Ocean. The
current solar cycle has weaker irradiance than the several prior
solar cycles, but the decreased irradiance can only partially
account for the decreased warming rate [17]. Variability of the El
Niño/La Niña cycle, described as a Pacific Decadal Oscillation,
largely accounts for the temporary decrease of warming [18], as
we discuss further below in conjunction with global temperature
simulations.
Assessments of dangerous climate change have focused on
estimating a permissible level of global warming. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [1,19] summarized broad-
based assessments with a ‘‘burning embers’’ diagram, which
indicated that major problems begin with global warming of 2–
3uC. A probabilistic analysis [20], still partly subjective, found a
median ‘‘dangerous’’ threshold of 2.8uC, with 95% confidence
that the dangerous threshold was 1.5uC or higher. These
assessments were relative to global temperature in year 1990, so
add 0.6uC to these values to obtain the warming relative to 1880–
1920, which is the base period we use in this paper for
preindustrial time. The conclusion that humanity could tolerate
global warming up to a few degrees Celsius meshed with common
sense. After all, people readily tolerate much larger regional and
seasonal climate variations.
Figure 2. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions and carbon content (1 ppm atmospheric CO2 , 2.12 GtC). Estimates of reserves (profitable to extract
at current prices) and resources (potentially recoverable with advanced technology and/or at higher prices) are the mean of estimates of Energy
Information Administration (EIA) [7], German Advisory Council (GAC) [8], and Global Energy Assessment (GEA) [9]. GEA [9] suggests the possibility of
.15,000 GtC unconventional gas. Error estimates (vertical lines) are from GEA and probably underestimate the total uncertainty. We convert energy
content to carbon content using emission factors of Table 4.2 of [15] for coal, gas and conventional oil, and, also following [15], emission factor of
unconventional oil is approximated as being the same as for coal. Total emissions through 2012, including gas flaring and cement manufacture, are
384 GtC; fossil fuel emissions alone are ,370 GtC.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g002
Figure 3. Global surface temperature relative to 1880–1920 mean. B shows the 5 and 11 year means. Figures are updates of [16] using data
through August 2013.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g003
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The fallacy of this logic emerged recently as numerous impacts
of ongoing global warming emerged and as paleoclimate
implications for climate sensitivity became apparent. Arctic sea
ice end-of-summer minimum area, although variable from year to
year, has plummeted by more than a third in the past few decades,
at a faster rate than in most models [21], with the sea ice thickness
declining a factor of four faster than simulated in IPCC climate
models [22]. The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets began to
shed ice at a rate, now several hundred cubic kilometers per year,
which is continuing to accelerate [23–25]. Mountain glaciers are
receding rapidly all around the world [26–29] with effects on
seasonal freshwater availability of major rivers [30–32]. The hot
dry subtropical climate belts have expanded as the troposphere has
warmed and the stratosphere cooled [33–36], contributing to
increases in the area and intensity of drought [37] and wildfires
[38]. The abundance of reef-building corals is decreasing at a rate
of 0.5–2%/year, at least in part due to ocean warming and
possibly ocean acidification caused by rising dissolved CO2 [39–
41]. More than half of all wild species have shown significant
changes in where they live and in the timing of major life events
[42–44]. Mega-heatwaves, such as those in Europe in 2003, the
Moscow area in 2010, Texas and Oklahoma in 2011, Greenland
in 2012, and Australia in 2013 have become more widespread
with the increase demonstrably linked to global warming [45–47].
These growing climate impacts, many more rapid than
anticipated and occurring while global warming is less than 1uC,
imply that society should reassess what constitutes a ‘‘dangerous
level’’ of global warming. Earth’s paleoclimate history provides a
valuable tool for that purpose.
Paleoclimate Temperature
Major progress in quantitative understanding of climate change
has occurred recently by use of the combination of data from high
resolution ice cores covering time scales of order several hundred
thousand years [48–49] and ocean cores for time scales of order
one hundred million years [50]. Quantitative insights on global
temperature sensitivity to external forcings [51–52] and sea level
sensitivity to global temperature [52–53] are crucial to our
analyses. Paleoclimate data also provide quantitative information
about how nominally slow feedback processes amplify climate
sensitivity [51–52,54–56], which also is important to our analyses.
Earth’s surface temperature prior to instrumental measurements
is estimated via proxy data. We will refer to the surface
temperature record in Fig. 4 of a recent paper [52]. Global mean
temperature during the Eemian interglacial period (120,000 years
ago) is constrained to be 2uC warmer than our pre-industrial
(1880–1920) level based on several studies of Eemian climate [52].
The concatenation of modern and instrumental records [52] is
based on an estimate that global temperature in the first decade of
the 21st century (+0.8uC relative to 1880–1920) exceeded the
Holocene mean by 0.2560.25uC. That estimate was based in part
on the fact that sea level is now rising 3.2 mm/yr (3.2 m/
millennium) [57], an order of magnitude faster than the rate
during the prior several thousand years, with rapid change of ice
sheet mass balance over the past few decades [23] and Greenland
and Antarctica now losing mass at accelerating rates [23–24]. This
concatenation, which has global temperature 13.9uC in the base
period 1951–1980, has the first decade of the 21st century slightly
(,0.1uC) warmer than the early Holocene maximum. A recent
reconstruction from proxy temperature data [55] concluded that
global temperature declined about 0.7uC between the Holocene
maximum and a pre-industrial minimum before recent warming
brought temperature back near the Holocene maximum, which is
consistent with our analysis.
Climate oscillations evident in Fig. 4 of Hansen et al. [52] were
instigated by perturbations of Earth’s orbit and spin axis tilt
relative to the orbital plane, which alter the geographical and
seasonal distribution of sunlight on Earth [58]. These forcings
change slowly, with periods between 20,000 and 400,000 years,
and thus climate is able to stay in quasi-equilibrium with these
forcings. Slow insolation changes initiated the climate oscillations,
but the mechanisms that caused the climate changes to be so large
were two powerful amplifying feedbacks: the planet’s surface
albedo (its reflectivity, literally its whiteness) and atmospheric CO2
amount. As the planet warms, ice and snow melt, causing the
surface to be darker, absorb more sunlight and warm further. As
the ocean and soil become warmer they release CO2 and other
greenhouse gases, causing further warming. Together with fast
feedbacks processes, via changes of water vapor, clouds, and the
vertical temperature profile, these slow amplifying feedbacks were
responsible for almost the entire glacial-to-interglacial temperature
change [59–62].
The albedo and CO2 feedbacks amplified weak orbital forcings,
the feedbacks necessarily changing slowly over millennia, at the
pace of orbital changes. Today, however, CO2 is under the control
of humans as fossil fuel emissions overwhelm natural changes.
Atmospheric CO2 has increased rapidly to a level not seen for at
least 3 million years [56,63]. Global warming induced by
increasing CO2 will cause ice to melt and hence sea level to rise
as the global volume of ice moves toward the quasi-equilibrium
amount that exists for a given global temperature [53]. As ice
melts and ice area decreases, the albedo feedback will amplify
global warming.
Earth, because of the climate system’s inertia, has not yet fully
responded to human-made changes of atmospheric composition.
The ocean’s thermal inertia, which delays some global warming
for decades and even centuries, is accounted for in global climate
models and its effect is confirmed via measurements of Earth’s
energy balance (see next section). In addition there are slow
climate feedbacks, such as changes of ice sheet size, that occur
mainly over centuries and millennia. Slow feedbacks have little
effect on the immediate planetary energy balance, instead coming
into play in response to temperature change. The slow feedbacks
are difficult to model, but paleoclimate data and observations of
ongoing changes help provide quantification.
Earth’s Energy Imbalance
At a time of climate stability, Earth radiates as much energy to
space as it absorbs from sunlight. Today Earth is out of balance
because increasing atmospheric gases such as CO2 reduce Earth’s
heat radiation to space, thus causing an energy imbalance, as there
is less energy going out than coming in. This imbalance causes
Earth to warm and move back toward energy balance. The
warming and restoration of energy balance take time, however,
because of Earth’s thermal inertia, which is due mainly to the
global ocean.
Earth warmed about 0.8uC in the past century. That warming
increased Earth’s radiation to space, thus reducing Earth’s energy
imbalance. The remaining energy imbalance helps us assess how
much additional warming is still ‘‘in the pipeline’’. Of course
increasing CO2 is only one of the factors affecting Earth’s energy
balance, even though it is the largest climate forcing. Other
forcings include changes of aerosols, solar irradiance, and Earth’s
surface albedo.
Determination of the state of Earth’s climate therefore requires
measuring the energy imbalance. This is a challenge, because the
imbalance is expected to be only about 1 W/m2 or less, so
accuracy approaching 0.1 W/m2 is needed. The most promising
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approach is to measure the rate of changing heat content of the
ocean, atmosphere, land, and ice [64]. Measurement of ocean heat
content is the most critical observation, as nearly 90 percent of the
energy surplus is stored in the ocean [64–65].
Observed Energy Imbalance
Nations of the world have launched a cooperative program to
measure changing ocean heat content, distributing more than
3000 Argo floats around the world ocean, with each float
repeatedly diving to a depth of 2 km and back [66]. Ocean
coverage by floats reached 90% by 2005 [66], with the gaps
mainly in sea ice regions, yielding the potential for an accurate
energy balance assessment, provided that several systematic
measurement biases exposed in the past decade are minimized
[67–69].
Argo data reveal that in 2005–2010 the ocean’s upper 2000 m
gained heat at a rate equal to 0.41 W/m2 averaged over Earth’s
surface [70]. Smaller contributions to planetary energy imbalance
are from heat gain by the deeper ocean (+0.10 W/m2), energy
used in net melting of ice (+0.05 W/m2), and energy taken up by
warming continents (+0.02 W/m2). Data sources for these
estimates and uncertainties are provided elsewhere [64]. The
resulting net planetary energy imbalance for the six years 2005–
2010 is +0.5860.15 W/m2.
The positive energy imbalance in 2005–2010 confirms that the
effect of solar variability on climate is much less than the effect of
human-made greenhouse gases. If the sun were the dominant
forcing, the planet would have a negative energy balance in 2005–
2010, when solar irradiance was at its lowest level in the period of
accurate data, i.e., since the 1970s [64,71]. Even though much of
the greenhouse gas forcing has been expended in causing observed
0.8uC global warming, the residual positive forcing overwhelms
the negative solar forcing. The full amplitude of solar cycle forcing
is about 0.25 W/m2 [64,71], but the reduction of solar forcing due
to the present weak solar cycle is about half that magnitude as we
illustrate below, so the energy imbalance measured during solar
minimum (0.58 W/m2) suggests an average imbalance over the
solar cycle of about 0.7 W/m2.
Earth’s measured energy imbalance has been used to infer the
climate forcing by aerosols, with two independent analyses yielding
a forcing in the past decade of about 21.5 W/m2 [64,72],
including the direct aerosol forcing and indirect effects via induced
cloud changes. Given this large (negative) aerosol forcing, precise
monitoring of changing aerosols is needed [73]. Public reaction to
increasingly bad air quality in developing regions [74] may lead to
future aerosol reductions, at least on a regional basis. Increase of
Earth’s energy imbalance from reduction of particulate air
pollution, which is needed for the sake of human health, can be
minimized via an emphasis on reducing absorbing black soot [75],
but the potential to constrain the net increase of climate forcing by
focusing on black soot is limited [76].
Energy Imbalance Implications for CO2 Target
Earth’s energy imbalance is the most vital number character-
izing the state of Earth’s climate. It informs us about the global
temperature change ‘‘in the pipeline’’ without further change of
climate forcings and it defines how much greenhouse gases must
be reduced to restore Earth’s energy balance, which, at least to a
good approximation, must be the requirement for stabilizing
global climate. The measured energy imbalance accounts for all
natural and human-made climate forcings, including changes of
atmospheric aerosols and Earth’s surface albedo.
If Earth’s mean energy imbalance today is +0.5 W/m2, CO2
must be reduced from the current level of 395 ppm (global-mean
annual-mean in mid-2013) to about 360 ppm to increase Earth’s
heat radiation to space by 0.5 W/m2 and restore energy balance.
If Earth’s energy imbalance is 0.75 W/m2, CO2 must be reduced
to about 345 ppm to restore energy balance [64,75].
The measured energy imbalance indicates that an initial CO2
target ‘‘,350 ppm’’ would be appropriate, if the aim is to stabilize
climate without further global warming. That target is consistent
with an earlier analysis [54]. Additional support for that target is
provided by our analyses of ongoing climate change and
paleoclimate, in later parts of our paper. Specification now of a
CO2 target more precise than ,350 ppm is difficult and
unnecessary, because of uncertain future changes of forcings
including other gases, aerosols and surface albedo. More precise
assessments will become available during the time that it takes to
turn around CO2 growth and approach the initial 350 ppm target.
Below we find the decreasing emissions scenario that would
achieve the 350 ppm target within the present century. Specifically,
we want to know the annual percentage rate at which emissions
must be reduced to reach this target, and the dependence of this rate
upon the date at which reductions are initiated. This approach is
complementary to the approach of estimating cumulative emissions
allowed to achieve a given limit on global warming [12].
Figure 4. Decay of atmospheric CO2 perturbations. (A) Instantaneous injection or extraction of CO2 with initial conditions at equilibrium. (B)
Fossil fuel emissions terminate at the end of 2015, 2030, or 2050 and land use emissions terminate after 2015 in all three cases, i.e., thereafter there is
no net deforestation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g004
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If the only human-made climate forcing were changes of
atmospheric CO2, the appropriate CO2 target might be close to
the pre-industrial CO2 amount [53]. However, there are other
human forcings, including aerosols, the effect of aerosols on
clouds, non-CO2 greenhouse gases, and changes of surface albedo
that will not disappear even if fossil fuel burning is phased out.
Aerosol forcings are substantially a result of fossil fuel burning
[1,76], but the net aerosol forcing is a sensitive function of various
aerosol sources [76]. The indirect aerosol effect on clouds is non-
linear [1,76] such that it has been suggested that even the modest
aerosol amounts added by pre-industrial humans to an otherwise
pristine atmosphere may have caused a significant climate forcing
[59]. Thus continued precise monitoring of Earth’s radiation
imbalance is probably the best way to assess and adjust the
appropriate CO2 target.
Ironically, future reductions of particulate air pollution may
exacerbate global warming by reducing the cooling effect of
reflective aerosols. However, a concerted effort to reduce non-CO2
forcings by methane, tropospheric ozone, other trace gases, and
black soot might counteract the warming from a decline in
reflective aerosols [54,75]. Our calculations below of future global
temperature assume such compensation, as a first approximation.
To the extent that goal is not achieved, adjustments must be made
in the CO2 target or future warming may exceed calculated values.
Climate Impacts
Determination of the dangerous level of global warming
inherently is partly subjective, but we must be as quantitative as
possible. Early estimates for dangerous global warming based on
the ‘‘burning embers’’ approach [1,19–20] have been recognized
as probably being too conservative [77]. A target of limiting
warming to 2uC has been widely adopted, as discussed above. We
suspect, however, that this may be a case of inching toward a
better answer. If our suspicion is correct, then that gradual
approach is itself very dangerous, because of the climate system’s
inertia. It will become exceedingly difficult to keep warming below
a target smaller than 2uC, if high emissions continue much longer.
We consider several important climate impacts and use
evidence from current observations to assess the effect of 0.8uC
warming and paleoclimate data for the effect of larger warming,
especially the Eemian period, which had global mean temperature
about +2uC relative to pre-industrial time. Impacts of special
interest are sea level rise and species extermination, because they
are practically irreversible, and others important to humankind.
Sea Level
The prior interglacial period, the Eemian, was at most ,2uC
warmer than 1880–1920 (Fig. 3). Sea level reached heights several
meters above today’s level [78–80], probably with instances of sea
level change of the order of 1 m/century [81–83]. Geologic
shoreline evidence has been interpreted as indicating a rapid sea
level rise of a few meters late in the Eemian to a peak about 9
meters above present, suggesting the possibility that a critical
stability threshold was crossed that caused polar ice sheet collapse
[84–85], although there remains debate within the research
community about this specific history and interpretation. The
large Eemian sea level excursions imply that substantial ice sheet
melting occurred when the world was little warmer than today.
During the early Pliocene, which was only ,3uC warmer than
the Holocene, sea level attained heights as much as 15–25 meters
higher than today [53,86–89]. Such sea level rise suggests that
parts of East Antarctica must be vulnerable to eventual melting
with global temperature increase of a few degrees Celsius. Indeed,
satellite gravity data and radar altimetry reveal that the Totten
Glacier of East Antarctica, which fronts a large ice mass grounded
below sea level, is now losing mass [90].
Greenland ice core data suggest that the Greenland ice sheet
response to Eemian warmth was limited [91], but the fifth IPCC
assessment [14] concludes that Greenland very likely contributed
between 1.4 and 4.3 m to the higher sea level of the Eemian. The
West Antarctic ice sheet is probably more susceptible to rapid
change, because much of it rests on bedrock well below sea level
[92–93]. Thus the entire 3–4 meters of global sea level contained
in that ice sheet may be vulnerable to rapid disintegration,
although arguments for stability of even this marine ice sheet have
been made [94]. However, Earth’s history reveals sea level
changes of as much as a few meters per century, even though the
natural climate forcings changed much more slowly than the
present human-made forcing.
Expected human-caused sea level rise is controversial in part
because predictions focus on sea level at a specific time, 2100. Sea
level on a given date is inherently difficult to predict, as it depends
on how rapidly non-linear ice sheet disintegration begins. Focus on
a single date also encourages people to take the estimated result as
an indication of what humanity faces, thus failing to emphasize
that the likely rate of sea level rise immediately after 2100 will be
much larger than within the 21st century, especially if CO2
emissions continue to increase.
Recent estimates of sea level rise by 2100 have been of the order
of 1 m [95–96], which is higher than earlier assessments [26], but
these estimates still in part assume linear relations between
warming and sea level rise. It has been argued [97–98] that
continued business-as-usual CO2 emissions are likely to spur a
nonlinear response with multi-meter sea level rise this century.
Greenland and Antarctica have been losing mass at rapidly
increasing rates during the period of accurate satellite data [23];
the data are suggestive of exponential increase, but the records are
too short to be conclusive. The area on Greenland with summer
melt has increased markedly, with 97% of Greenland experiencing
melt in 2012 [99].
The important point is that the uncertainty is not about whether
continued rapid CO2 emissions would cause large sea level rise,
submerging global coastlines – it is about how soon the large
changes would begin. The carbon from fossil fuel burning will
remain in and affect the climate system for many millennia,
ensuring that over time sea level rise of many meters will occur –
tens of meters if most of the fossil fuels are burned [53]. That order
of sea level rise would result in the loss of hundreds of historical
coastal cities worldwide with incalculable economic consequences,
create hundreds of millions of global warming refugees from
highly-populated low-lying areas, and thus likely cause major
international conflicts.
Shifting Climate Zones
Theory and climate models indicate that the tropical overturn-
ing (Hadley) atmospheric circulation expands poleward with
global warming [33]. There is evidence in satellite and radiosonde
data and in observational data for poleward expansion of the
tropical circulation by as much as a few degrees of latitude since
the 1970s [34–35], but natural variability may have contributed to
that expansion [36]. Change in the overturning circulation likely
contributes to expansion of subtropical conditions and increased
aridity in the southern United States [30,100], the Mediterranean
region, South America, southern Africa, Madagascar, and
southern Australia. Increased aridity and temperature contribute
to increased forest fires that burn hotter and are more destructive
[38].
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Despite large year-to-year variability of temperature, decadal
averages reveal isotherms (lines of a given average temperature)
moving poleward at a typical rate of the order of 100 km/decade
in the past three decades [101], although the range shifts for
specific species follow more complex patterns [102]. This rapid
shifting of climate zones far exceeds natural rates of change.
Movement has been in the same direction (poleward, and upward
in elevation) since about 1975. Wild species have responded to
climate change, with three-quarters of marine species shifting their
ranges poleward as much as 1000 km [44,103] and more than half
of terrestrial species shifting ranges poleward as much as 600 km
and upward as much as 400 m [104].
Humans may adapt to shifting climate zones better than many
species. However, political borders can interfere with human
migration, and indigenous ways of life already have been adversely
affected [26]. Impacts are apparent in the Arctic, with melting
tundra, reduced sea ice, and increased shoreline erosion. Effects of
shifting climate zones also may be important for indigenous
Americans who possess specific designated land areas, as well as
other cultures with long-standing traditions in South America,
Africa, Asia and Australia.
Human Extermination of Species
Biodiversity is affected by many agents including overharvest-
ing, introduction of exotic species, land use changes, nitrogen
fertilization, and direct effects of increased atmospheric CO2 on
plant ecophysiology [43]. However, an overriding role of climate
change is exposed by diverse effects of rapid warming on animals,
plants, and insects in the past three decades.
A sudden widespread decline of frogs, with extinction of entire
mountain-restricted species attributed to global warming [105–
106], provided a dramatic awakening. There are multiple causes
of the detailed processes involved in global amphibian declines and
extinctions [107–108], but global warming is a key contributor
and portends a planetary-scale mass extinction in the making
unless action is taken to stabilize climate while also fighting
biodiversity’s other threats [109].
Mountain-restricted and polar-restricted species are particularly
vulnerable. As isotherms move up the mountainside and poleward,
so does the climate zone in which a given species can survive. If
global warming continues unabated, many of these species will be
effectively pushed off the planet. There are already reductions in
the population and health of Arctic species in the southern parts of
the Arctic, Antarctic species in the northern parts of the Antarctic,
and alpine species worldwide [43].
A critical factor for survival of some Arctic species is retention of
all-year sea ice. Continued growth of fossil fuel emissions will cause
loss of all Arctic summer sea ice within several decades. In
contrast, the scenario in Fig. 5A, with global warming peaking just
over 1uC and then declining slowly, should allow summer sea ice
to survive and then gradually increase to levels representative of
recent decades.
The threat to species survival is not limited to mountain and
polar species. Plant and animal distributions reflect the regional
climates to which they are adapted. Although species attempt to
migrate in response to climate change, their paths may be blocked
by human-constructed obstacles or natural barriers such as coast
lines and mountain ranges. As the shift of climate zones [110]
becomes comparable to the range of some species, less mobile
species can be driven to extinction. Because of extensive species
interdependencies, this can lead to mass extinctions.
Rising sea level poses a threat to a large number of uniquely
evolved endemic fauna living on islands in marine-dominated
ecosystems, with those living on low lying islands being especially
vulnerable. Evolutionary history on Bermuda offers numerous
examples of the direct and indirect impact of changing sea level on
evolutionary processes [111–112], with a number of taxa being
extirpated due to habitat changes, greater competition, and island
inundation [113]. Similarly, on Aldahabra Island in the Indian
Ocean, land tortoises were exterminated during sea level high
stands [114]. Vulnerabilities would be magnified by the speed of
human-made climate change and the potentially large sea level
rise [115].
IPCC [26] reviewed studies relevant to estimating eventual
extinctions. They estimate that if global warming exceeds 1.6uC
above preindustrial, 9–31 percent of species will be committed to
extinction. With global warming of 2.9uC, an estimated 21–52
percent of species will be committed to extinction. A compre-
hensive study of biodiversity indicators over the past decade [116]
reveals that, despite some local success in increasing extent of
protected areas, overall indicators of pressures on biodiversity
including that due to climate change are continuing to increase
and indicators of the state of biodiversity are continuing to
decline.
Mass extinctions occurred several times in Earth’s history [117–
118], often in conjunction with rapid climate change. New species
evolved over millions of years, but those time scales are almost
beyond human comprehension. If we drive many species to
extinction we will leave a more desolate, monotonous planet for
our children, grandchildren, and more generations than we can
imagine. We will also undermine ecosystem functions (e.g.,
pollination which is critical for food production) and ecosystem
resilience (when losing keystone species in food chains), as well as
reduce functional diversity (critical for the ability of ecosystems to
respond to shocks and stress) and genetic diversity that plays an
important role for development of new medicines, materials, and
sources of energy.
Coral Reef Ecosystems
Coral reefs are the most biologically diverse marine ecosystem,
often described as the rainforests of the ocean. Over a million
species, most not yet described [119], are estimated to populate
coral reef ecosystems generating crucial ecosystem services for at
least 500 million people in tropical coastal areas. These ecosystems
are highly vulnerable to the combined effects of ocean acidification
and warming.
Acidification arises as the ocean absorbs CO2, producing
carbonic acid [120], thus making the ocean more corrosive to the
calcium carbonate shells (exoskeletons) of many marine organ-
isms. Geochemical records show that ocean pH is already outside
its range of the past several million years [121–122]. Warming
causes coral bleaching, as overheated coral expel symbiotic algae
and become vulnerable to disease and mortality [123]. Coral
bleaching and slowing of coral calcification already are causing
mass mortalities, increased coral disease, and reduced reef
carbonate accretion, thus disrupting coral reef ecosystem health
[40,124].
Local human-made stresses add to the global warming and
acidification effects, all of these driving a contraction of 1–2% per
year in the abundance of reef-building corals [39]. Loss of the
three-dimensional coral reef frameworks has consequences for all
the species that depend on them. Loss of these frameworks also has
consequences for the important roles that coral reefs play in
supporting fisheries and protecting coastlines from wave stress.
Consequences of lost coral reefs can be economically devastating
for many nations, especially in combination with other impacts
such as sea level rise and intensification of storms.
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Climate Extremes
Changes in the frequency and magnitude of climate extremes,
of both moisture and temperature, are affected by climate trends
as well as changing variability. Extremes of the hydrologic cycle
are expected to intensify in a warmer world. A warmer
atmosphere holds more moisture, so precipitation can be heavier
and cause more extreme flooding. Higher temperatures, on the
other hand, increase evaporation and can intensify droughts when
they occur, as can expansion of the subtropics, as discussed above.
Global models for the 21st century find an increased variability of
precipitation minus evaporation [P-E] in most of the world,
especially near the equator and at high latitudes [125]. Some
models also show an intensification of droughts in the Sahel,
driven by increasing greenhouse gases [126].
Observations of ocean salinity patterns for the past 50 years
reveal an intensification of [P-E] patterns as predicted by models,
but at an even faster rate. Precipitation observations over land
show the expected general increase of precipitation poleward of
the subtropics and decrease at lower latitudes [1,26]. An increase
of intense precipitation events has been found on much of the
world’s land area [127–129]. Evidence for widespread drought
intensification is less clear and inherently difficult to confirm with
available data because of the increase of time-integrated precip-
itation at most locations other than the subtropics. Data analyses
have found an increase of drought intensity at many locations
[130–131] The magnitude of change depends on the drought
index employed [132], but soil moisture provides a good means to
separate the effect of shifting seasonal precipitation and confirms
an overall drought intensification [37].
Global warming of ,0.6uC since the 1970s (Fig. 3) has already
caused a notable increase in the occurrence of extreme summer heat
[46]. The likelihood of occurrence or the fractional area covered by
3-standard-deviation hot anomalies, relative to a base period (1951–
1980) that was still within the range of Holocene climate, has
increased by more than a factor of ten. Large areas around Moscow,
the Mediterranean region, the United States and Australia have
experienced such extreme anomalies in the past three years. Heat
waves lasting for weeks have a devastating impact on human health:
the European heat wave of summer 2003 caused over 70,000 excess
deaths [133]. This heat record for Europe was surpassed already in
2010 [134]. The number of extreme heat waves has increased
several-fold due to global warming [45–46,135] and will increase
further if temperatures continue to rise.
Human Health
Impacts of climate change cause widespread harm to human
health, with children often suffering the most. Food shortages,
polluted air, contaminated or scarce supplies of water, an
expanding area of vectors causing infectious diseases, and more
intensely allergenic plants are among the harmful impacts [26].
More extreme weather events cause physical and psychological
harm. World health experts have concluded with ‘‘very high
confidence’’ that climate change already contributes to the global
burden of disease and premature death [26].
IPCC [26] projects the following trends, if global warming
continue to increase, where only trends assigned very high
confidence or high confidence are included: (i) increased
malnutrition and consequent disorders, including those related
to child growth and development, (ii) increased death, disease and
injuries from heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts, (iii)
increased cardio-respiratory morbidity and mortality associated
with ground-level ozone. While IPCC also projects fewer deaths
from cold, this positive effect is far outweighed by the negative
ones.
Growing awareness of the consequences of human-caused
climate change triggers anxiety and feelings of helplessness [136–
137]. Children, already susceptible to age-related insecurities, face
additional destabilizing insecurities from questions about how they
will cope with future climate change [138–139]. Exposure to
media ensures that children cannot escape hearing that their
future and that of other species is at stake, and that the window of
opportunity to avoid dramatic climate impacts is closing. The
psychological health of our children is a priority, but denial of the
truth exposes our children to even greater risk.
Health impacts of climate change are in addition to direct
effects of air and water pollution. A clear illustration of direct
effects of fossil fuels on human health was provided by an
inadvertent experiment in China during the 1950–1980 period of
central planning, when free coal for winter heating was provided
to North China but not to the rest of the country. Analysis of the
impact was made [140] using the most comprehensive data file
ever compiled on mortality and air pollution in any developing
country. A principal conclusion was that the 500 million residents
of North China experienced during the 1990s a loss of more than
2.5 billion life years owing to the added air pollution, and an
average reduction in life expectancy of 5.5 years. The degree of air
pollution in China exceeded that in most of the world, yet
Figure 5. Atmospheric CO2 if fossil fuel emissions reduced. (A) 6% or 2% annual cut begins in 2013 and 100 GtC reforestation drawdown
occurs in 2031–2080, (B) effect of delaying onset of emission reduction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g005
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assessments of total health effects must also include other fossil fuel
caused air and water pollutants, as discussed in the following
section on ecology and the environment.
The Text S1 has further discussion of health impacts of climate
change.
Ecology and the Environment
The ecological impact of fossil fuel mining increases as the
largest, easiest to access, resources are depleted [141]. A constant
fossil fuel production rate requires increasing energy input, but
also use of more land, water, and diluents, with the production of
more waste [142]. The increasing ecological and environmental
impact of a given amount of useful fossil fuel energy is a relevant
consideration in assessing alternative energy strategies.
Coal mining has progressively changed from predominantly
underground mining to surface mining [143], including moun-
taintop removal with valley fill, which is now widespread in the
Appalachian ecoregion in the United States. Forest cover and
topsoil are removed, explosives are used to break up rocks to
access coal, and the excess rock is pushed into adjacent valleys,
where it buries existing streams. Burial of headwater streams
causes loss of ecosystems that are important for nutrient cycling
and production of organic matter for downstream food webs
[144]. The surface alterations lead to greater storm runoff [145]
with likely impact on downstream flooding. Water emerging from
valley fills contain toxic solutes that have been linked to declines in
watershed biodiversity [146]. Even with mine-site reclamation
intended to restore pre-mined surface conditions, mine-derived
chemical constituents are found in domestic well water [147].
Reclaimed areas, compared with unmined areas, are found to
have increased soil density with decreased organic and nutrient
content, and with reduced water infiltration rates [148].
Reclaimed areas have been found to produce little if any regrowth
of woody vegetation even after 15 years [149], and, although this
deficiency might be addressed via more effective reclamation
methods, there remains a likely significant loss of carbon storage
[149].
Oil mining has an increasing ecological footprint per unit
delivered energy because of the decreasing size of new fields and
their increased geographical dispersion; transit distances are
greater and wells are deeper, thus requiring more energy input
[145]. Useful quantitative measures of the increasing ecological
impacts are provided by the history of oil development in Alberta,
Canada for production of both conventional oil and tar sands
development. The area of land required per barrel of produced oil
increased by a factor of 12 between 1955 and 2006 [150] leading
to ecosystem fragmentation by roads and pipelines needed to
support the wells [151]. Additional escalation of the mining impact
occurs as conventional oil mining is supplanted by tar sands
development, with mining and land disturbance from the latter
producing land use-related greenhouse gas emissions as much as
23 times greater than conventional oil production per unit area
[152], but with substantial variability and uncertainty [152–153].
Much of the tar sands bitumen is extracted through surface mining
that removes the ‘‘overburden’’ (i.e., boreal forest ecosystems) and
tar sand from large areas to a depth up to 100 m, with ecological
impacts downstream and in the mined area [154]. Although
mined areas are supposed to be reclaimed, as in the case of
mountaintop removal, there is no expectation that the ecological
value of reclaimed areas will be equivalent to predevelopment
condition [141,155]. Landscape changes due to tar sands mining
and reclamation cause a large loss of peatland and stored carbon,
while also significantly reducing carbon sequestration potential
[156]. Lake sediment cores document increased chemical
pollution of ecosystems during the past several decades traceable
to tar sands development [157] and snow and water samples
indicate that recent levels of numerous pollutants exceeded local
and national criteria for protection of aquatic organisms [158].
Gas mining by unconventional means has rapidly expanded in
recent years, without commensurate understanding of the
ecological, environmental and human health consequences
[159]. The predominant approach is hydraulic fracturing (‘‘frack-
ing’’) of deep shale formations via injection of millions of gallons of
water, sand and toxic chemicals under pressure, thus liberating
methane [155,160]. A large fraction of the injected water returns
to the surface as wastewater containing high concentrations of
heavy metals, oils, greases and soluble organic compounds [161].
Management of this wastewater is a major technical challenge,
especially because the polluted waters can continue to backflow
from the wells for many years [161]. Numerous instances of
groundwater and river contamination have been cited [162]. High
levels of methane leakage from fracking have been found [163], as
well as nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds [159].
Methane leaks increase the climate impact of shale gas, but
whether the leaks are sufficient to significantly alter the climate
forcing by total natural gas development is uncertain [164].
Overall, environmental and ecologic threats posed by unconven-
tional gas extraction are uncertain because of limited research,
however evidence for groundwater pollution on both local and
river basin scales is a major concern [165].
Today, with cumulative carbon emissions ,370 GtC from all
fossil fuels, we are at a point of severely escalating ecological and
environmental impacts from fossil fuel use and fossil fuel mining,
as is apparent from the mountaintop removal for coal, tar sands
extraction of oil, and fracking for gas. The ecological and
environmental implications of scenarios with carbon emissions of
1000 GtC or greater, as discussed below, would be profound and
should influence considerations of appropriate energy strategies.
Summary: Climate Impacts
Climate impacts accompanying global warming of 2uC or more
would be highly deleterious. Already there are numerous
indications of substantial effects in response to warming of the
past few decades. That warming has brought global temperature
close to if not slightly above the prior range of the Holocene. We
conclude that an appropriate target would be to keep global
temperature at a level within or close to the Holocene range.
Global warming of 2uC would be well outside the Holocene range
and far into the dangerous range.
Transient Climate Change
We must quantitatively relate fossil fuel emissions to global
temperature in order to assess how rapidly fossil fuel emissions
must be phased down to stay under a given temperature limit.
Thus we must deal with both a transient carbon cycle and
transient global climate change.
Global climate fluctuates stochastically and also responds to
natural and human-made climate forcings [1,166]. Forcings,
measured in W/m2 averaged over the globe, are imposed
perturbations of Earth’s energy balance caused by changing
forcing agents such as solar irradiance and human-made
greenhouse gases (GHGs). CO2 accounts for more than 80% of
the added GHG forcing in the past 15 years [64,167] and, if fossil
fuel emissions continue at a high level, CO2 will be the dominant
driver of future global temperature change.
We first define our method of calculating atmospheric CO2 as a
function of fossil fuel emissions. We then define our assumptions
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about the potential for drawing down atmospheric CO2 via
reforestation and increase of soil carbon, and we define fossil fuel
emission reduction scenarios that we employ in our study. Finally
we describe all forcings employed in our calculations of global
temperature and the method used to simulate global temperature.
Carbon Cycle and Atmospheric CO2
The carbon cycle defines the fate of CO2 injected into the air by
fossil fuel burning [1,168] as the additional CO2 distributes itself
over time among surface carbon reservoirs: the atmosphere,
ocean, soil, and biosphere. We use the dynamic-sink pulse-
response function version of the well-tested Bern carbon cycle
model [169], as described elsewhere [54,170].
Specifically, we solve equations 3–6, 16–17, A.2.2, and A.3 of
Joos et al. [169] using the same parameters and assumptions
therein, except that initial (1850) atmospheric CO2 is assumed to
be 285.2 ppm [167]. Historical fossil fuel CO2 emissions are from
Boden et al. [5]. This Bern model incorporates non-linear ocean
chemistry feedbacks and CO2 fertilization of the terrestrial
biosphere, but it omits climate-carbon feedbacks, e.g., assuming
static global climate and ocean circulation. Therefore our results
should be regarded as conservative, especially for scenarios with
large emissions.
A pulse of CO2 injected into the air decays by half in about 25
years as CO2 is taken up by the ocean, biosphere and soil, but
nearly one-fifth is still in the atmosphere after 500 years (Fig. 4A).
Eventually, over hundreds of millennia, weathering of rocks will
deposit all of this initial CO2 pulse on the ocean floor as carbonate
sediments [168].
Under equilibrium conditions a negative CO2 pulse, i.e.,
artificial extraction and storage of some CO2 amount, decays at
about the same rate as a positive pulse (Fig. 4A). Thus if it is
decided in the future that CO2 must be extracted from the air and
removed from the carbon cycle (e.g., by storing it underground or
in carbonate bricks), the impact on atmospheric CO2 amount will
diminish in time. This occurs because carbon is exchanged among
the surface carbon reservoirs as they move toward an equilibrium
distribution, and thus, e.g., CO2 out-gassing by the ocean can
offset some of the artificial drawdown. The CO2 extraction
required to reach a given target atmospheric CO2 level therefore
depends on the prior emission history and target timeframe, but
the amount that must be extracted substantially exceeds the net
reduction of the atmospheric CO2 level that will be achieved. We
clarify this matter below by means of specific scenarios for capture
of CO2.
It is instructive to see how fast atmospheric CO2 declines if fossil
fuel emissions are instantly terminated (Fig. 4B). Halting emissions
in 2015 causes CO2 to decline to 350 ppm at century’s end (Fig.
4B). A 20 year delay in halting emissions has CO2 returning to
350 ppm at about 2300. With a 40 year delay, CO2 does not
return to 350 ppm until after 3000. These results show how
difficult it is to get back to 350 ppm if emissions continue to grow
for even a few decades.
These results emphasize the urgency of initiating emissions reduction [171].
As discussed above, keeping global climate close to the Holocene
range requires a long-term atmospheric CO2 level of about
350 ppm or less, with other climate forcings similar to today’s
levels. If emissions reduction had begun in 2005, reduction at
3.5%/year would have achieved 350 ppm at 2100. Now the
requirement is at least 6%/year. Delay of emissions reductions
until 2020 requires a reduction rate of 15%/year to achieve
350 ppm in 2100. If we assume only 50 GtC reforestation, and
begin emissions reduction in 2013, the required reduction rate
becomes about 9%/year.
Reforestation and Soil Carbon
Of course fossil fuel emissions will not suddenly terminate.
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to return CO2 to 350 ppm this
century. Reforestation and increase of soil carbon can help draw
down atmospheric CO2. Fossil fuels account for ,80% of the CO2
increase from preindustrial time, with land use/deforestation
accounting for 20% [1,170,172–173]. Net deforestation to date is
estimated to be 100 GtC (gigatons of carbon) with 650%
uncertainty [172].
Complete restoration of deforested areas is unrealistic, yet 100
GtC carbon drawdown is conceivable because: (1) the human-
enhanced atmospheric CO2 level increases carbon uptake by some
vegetation and soils, (2) improved agricultural practices can
convert agriculture from a CO2 ource into a CO2 sink [174], (3)
biomass-burning power plants with CO2 capture and storage can
contribute to CO2 drawdown.
Forest and soil storage of 100 GtC is challenging, but has other
benefits. Reforestation has been successful in diverse places [175].
Minimum tillage with biological nutrient recycling, as opposed to
plowing and chemical fertilizers, could sequester 0.4–1.2 GtC/year
[176] while conserving water in soils, building agricultural resilience
to climate change, and increasing productivity especially in
smallholder rain-fed agriculture, thereby reducing expansion of
agriculture into forested ecosystems [177–178]. Net tropical defor-
estation may have decreased in the past decade [179], but because of
extensive deforestation in earlier decades [170,172–173,180–181]
there is a large amount of land suitable for reforestation [182].
Use of bioenergy to draw down CO2 should employ feedstocks
from residues, wastes, and dedicated energy crops that do not
compete with food crops, thus avoiding loss of natural ecosystems and
cropland [183–185]. Reforestation competes with agricultural land
use; land needs could decline by reducing use of animal products, as
livestock now consume more than half of all crops [186].
Our reforestation scenarios assume that today’s net deforesta-
tion rate (,1 GtC/year; see [54]) will stay constant until 2020,
then linearly decrease to zero by 2030, followed by sinusoidal 100
GtC biospheric carbon storage over 2031–2080. Alternative
timings do not alter conclusions about the potential to achieve a
given CO2 level such as 350 ppm.
Emission Reduction Scenarios
A 6%/year decrease of fossil fuel emissions beginning in 2013,
with 100 GtC reforestation, achieves a CO2 decline to 350 ppm
near the end of this century (Fig. 5A). Cumulative fossil fuel
emissions in this scenario are ,129 GtC from 2013 to 2050, with
an additional 14 GtC by 2100. If our assumed land use changes
occur a decade earlier, CO2 returns to 350 ppm several years
earlier; however that has negligible effect on the maximum global
temperature calculated below.
Delaying fossil fuel emission cuts until 2020 (with 2%/year
emissions growth in 2012–2020) causes CO2 to remain above
350 ppm (with associated impacts on climate) until 2300 (Fig. 5B).
If reductions are delayed until 2030 or 2050, CO2 remains above
350 ppm or 400 ppm, respectively, until well after 2500.
We conclude that it is urgent that large, long-term emission
reductions begin soon. Even if a 6%/year reduction rate and 500
GtC are not achieved, it makes a huge difference when reductions
begin. There is no practical justification for why emissions
necessarily must even approach 1000 GtC.
Climate Forcings
Atmospheric CO2 and other GHGs have been well-measured
for the past half century, allowing accurate calculation of their
climate forcing. The growth rate of the GHG forcing has declined
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moderately since its peak values in the 1980s, as the growth rate of
CH4 and chlorofluorocarbons has slowed [187]. Annual changes
of CO2 are highly correlated with the El Niño cycle (Fig. 6). Two
strong La Niñas in the past five years have depressed CO2 growth
as well as the global warming rate (Fig. 3). The CO2 growth rate
and warming rate can be expected to increase as we move into the
next El Niño, with the CO2 growth already reaching 3 ppm/year
in mid-2013 [188]. The CO2 climate forcing does not increase as
rapidly as the CO2 amount because of partial saturation of CO2
absorption bands [75]. The GHG forcing is now increasing at a
rate of almost 0.4 W/m2 per decade [187].
Solar irradiance variations are sometimes assumed to be the
most likely natural driver of climate change. Solar irradiance has
been measured from satellites since the late 1970s (Fig. 7). These
data are from a composite of several satellite-measured time series.
Data through 28 February 2003 are from [189] and Physikalisch
Meteorologisches Observatorium Davos, World Radiation Center.
Subsequent update is from University of Colorado Solar Radiation
& Climate Experiment (SORCE). Data sets are concatenated by
matching the means over the first 12 months of SORCE data.
Monthly sunspot numbers (Fig. 7) support the conclusion that the
solar irradiance in the current solar cycle is significantly lower than
in the three preceding solar cycles. Amplification of the direct solar
forcing is conceivable, e.g., through effects on ozone or
atmospheric condensation nuclei, but empirical data place a
factor of two upper limit on the amplification, with the most likely
forcing in the range 100–120% of the directly measured solar
irradiance change [64].
Recent reduced solar irradiance (Fig. 7) may have decreased the
forcing over the past decade by about half of the full amplitude of
measured irradiance variability, thus yielding a negative forcing of,
say, 2 0.12 W/m2. This compares with a decadal increase of the
GHG forcing that is positive and about three times larger in
magnitude. Thus the solar forcing is not negligible and might
partially account for the slowdown in global warming in the past
decade [17]. However, we must (1) compare the solar forcing with
the net of other forcings, which enhances the importance of solar
change, because the net forcing is smaller than the GHG forcing,
and (2) consider forcing changes on longer time scales, which
greatly diminishes the importance of solar change, because solar
variability is mainly oscillatory.
Human-made tropospheric aerosols, which arise largely from
fossil fuel use, cause a substantial negative forcing. As noted above,
two independent analyses [64,72] yield a total (direct plus indirect)
aerosol forcing in the past decade of about 21.5 W/m2, half the
magnitude of the GHG forcing and opposite in sign. That
empirical aerosol forcing assessment for the past decade is
consistent with the climate forcings scenario (Fig. 8) that we use
for the past century in the present and prior studies [64,190].
Supplementary Table S1 specifies the historical forcings and Table
S2 gives several scenarios for future forcings.
Future Climate Forcings
Future global temperature change should depend mainly on
atmospheric CO2, at least if fossil fuel emissions remain high. Thus
to provide the clearest picture of the CO2 effect, we approximate
the net future change of human-made non-CO2 forcings as zero
and we exclude future changes of natural climate forcings, such as
solar irradiance and volcanic aerosols. Here we discuss possible
effects of these approximations.
Uncertainties in non-CO2 forcings concern principally solar,
aerosol and other GHG forcings. Judging from the sunspot
numbers (Fig. 7B and [191]) for the past four centuries, the current
solar cycle is almost as weak as the Dalton Minimum of the late
18th century. Conceivably irradiance could decline further to the
level of the Maunder Minimum of the late 17th century [192–
193]. For our simulation we choose an intermediate path between
recovery to the level before the current solar cycle and decline to a
still lower level. Specifically, we keep solar irradiance fixed at the
reduced level of 2010, which is probably not too far off in either
direction. Irradiance in 2010 is about 0.1 W/m2 less than the
mean of the prior three solar cycles, a decrease of forcing that
Figure 6. Annual increase of CO2 based on data from the NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory [188]. Prior to 1981 the CO2 change
is based on only Mauna Loa, Hawaii. Temperature changes in lower diagram are 12-month running means for the globe and Niño3.4 area [16].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g006
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would be restored by the CO2 increase within 3–4 years at its
current growth rate. Extensive simulations [17,194] confirm that
the effect of solar variability is small compared with GHGs if CO2
emissions continue at a high level. However, solar forcing can
affect the magnitude and detection of near-term warming. Also, if
rapidly declining GHG emissions are achieved, changes of solar
forcing will become relatively more important.
Aerosols present a larger uncertainty. Expectations of decreases
in large source regions such as China [195] may be counteracted
by aerosol increases other places as global population continues to
increase. Our assumption of unchanging human-made aerosols
could be substantially off in either direction. For the sake of
interpreting on-going and future climate change it is highly
desirable to obtain precise monitoring of the global aerosol forcing
[73].
Non-CO2 GHG forcing has continued to increase at a slow rate
since 1995 (Fig. 6 in [64]). A desire to constrain climate change
may help reduce emissions of these gases in the future. However, it
will be difficult to prevent or fully offset positive forcing from
increasing N2O, as its largest source is associated with food
production and the world’s population is continuing to rise.
On the other hand, we are also probably underestimating a
negative aerosol forcing, e.g., because we have not included future
volcanic aerosols. Given the absence of large volcanic eruptions in
the past two decades (the last one being Mount Pinatubo in 1991),
multiple volcanic eruptions would cause a cooling tendency [196]
and reduce heat storage in the ocean [197].
Overall, we expect the errors due to our simple approximation
of non-CO2 forcings to be partially off-setting. Specifically, we
have likely underestimated a positive forcing by non-CO2 GHGs,
while also likely underestimating a negative aerosol forcing.
Figure 7. Solar irradiance and sunspot number in the era of satellite data (see text). Left scale is the energy passing through an area
perpendicular to Sun-Earth line. Averaged over Earth’s surface the absorbed solar energy is ,240 W/m2, so the full amplitude of measured solar
variability is ,0.25 W/m2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g007
Figure 8. Climate forcings employed in our six main scenarios. Forcings through 2010 are as in [64].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g008
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Note that uncertainty in forcings is partly obviated via the focus
on Earth’s energy imbalance in our analysis. The planet’s energy
imbalance is an integrative quantity that is especially useful for a
case in which some of the forcings are uncertain or unmeasured.
Earth’s measured energy imbalance includes the effects of all
forcings, whether they are measured or not.
Simulations of Future Global Temperature
We calculate global temperature change for a given CO2
scenario using a climate response function (Table S3) that
accurately replicates results from a global climate model with
sensitivity 3uC for doubled CO2 [64]. A best estimate of climate
sensitivity close to 3uC for doubled CO2 has been inferred from
paleoclimate data [51–52]. This empirical climate sensitivity is
generally consistent with that of global climate models [1], but the
empirical approach makes the inferred high sensitivity more
certain and the quantitative evaluation more precise. Because this
climate sensitivity is derived from empirical data on how Earth
responded to past changes of boundary conditions, including
atmospheric composition, our conclusions about limits on fossil
fuel emissions can be regarded as largely independent of climate
models.
The detailed temporal and geographical response of the climate
system to the rapid human-made change of climate forcings is not
well-constrained by empirical data, because there is no faithful
paleoclimate analog. Thus climate models necessarily play an
important role in assessing practical implications of climate
change. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw important conclusions
with transparent computations. A simple response function
(Green’s function) calculation [64] yields an estimate of global
mean temperature change in response to a specified time series for
global climate forcing. This approach accounts for the delayed
response of the climate system caused by the large thermal inertia
of the ocean, yielding a global mean temporal response in close
accord with that obtained from global climate models.
Tables S1 and S2 in Supporting Information give the forcings
we employ and Table S3 gives the climate response function for
our Green’s function calculation, defined by equation 2 of [64].
The Green’s function is driven by the net forcing, which, with the
response function, is sufficient information for our results to be
reproduced. However, we also include the individual forcings in
Table S1, in case researchers wish to replace specific forcings or
use them for other purposes.
Simulated global temperature (Fig. 9) is for CO2 scenarios of
Fig. 5. Peak global warming is ,1.1uC, declining to less than 1uC
by mid-century, if CO2 emissions are reduced 6%/year beginning
in 2013. In contrast, warming reaches 1.5uC and stays above 1uC
until after 2400 if emissions continue to increase until 2030, even
though fossil fuel emissions are phased out rapidly (5%/year) after
2030 and 100 GtC reforestation occurs during 2030–2080. If
emissions continue to increase until 2050, simulated warming
exceeds 2uC well into the 22nd century.
Increased global temperature persists for many centuries after
the climate forcing declines, because of the thermal inertia of the
ocean [198]. Some temperature reduction is possible if the climate
forcing is reduced rapidly, before heat has penetrated into the
deeper ocean. Cooling by a few tenths of a degree in Fig. 9 is a
result mainly of the 100 GtC biospheric uptake of CO2 during
2030–2080. Note the longevity of the warming, especially if
emissions reduction is as slow as 2%/year, which might be
considered to be a rapid rate of reduction.
The temporal response of the real world to the human-made
climate forcing could be more complex than suggested by a simple
response function calculation, especially if rapid emissions growth
continues, yielding an unprecedented climate forcing scenario. For
example, if ice sheet mass loss becomes rapid, it is conceivable that
the cold fresh water added to the ocean could cause regional
surface cooling [199], perhaps even at a point when sea level rise
has only reached a level of the order of a meter [200]. However,
any uncertainty in the surface thermal response this century due to
such phenomena has little effect on our estimate of the dangerous
level of emissions. The long lifetime of the fossil fuel carbon in the
climate system and the persistence of ocean warming for millennia
[201] provide sufficient time for the climate system to achieve full
response to the fast feedback processes included in the 3uC climate
sensitivity.
Indeed, the long lifetime of fossil fuel carbon in the climate
system and persistence of the ocean warming ensure that ‘‘slow’’
feedbacks, such as ice sheet disintegration, changes of the global
vegetation distribution, melting of permafrost, and possible release
of methane from methane hydrates on continental shelves, would
also have time to come into play. Given the unprecedented
rapidity of the human-made climate forcing, it is difficult to
establish how soon slow feedbacks will become important, but
clearly slow feedbacks should be considered in assessing the
‘‘dangerous’’ level of global warming, as discussed in the next
section.
Danger of Initiating Uncontrollable Climate
Change
Our calculated global warming as a function of CO2 amount is
based on equilibrium climate sensitivity 3uC for doubled CO2.
That is the central climate sensitivity estimate from climate models
[1], and it is consistent with climate sensitivity inferred from
Earth’s climate history [51–52]. However, this climate sensitivity
includes only the effects of fast feedbacks of the climate system,
such as water vapor, clouds, aerosols, and sea ice. Slow feedbacks,
such as change of ice sheet area and climate-driven changes of
greenhouse gases, are not included.
Slow Climate Feedbacks and Irreversible Climate Change
Excluding slow feedbacks was appropriate for simulations of the
past century, because we know the ice sheets were stable then and
our climate simulations used observed greenhouse gas amounts
that included any contribution from slow feedbacks. However, we
must include slow feedbacks in projections of warming for the 21st
century and beyond. Slow feedbacks are important because they
affect climate sensitivity and because their instigation is related to
the danger of passing ‘‘points of no return’’, beyond which
irreversible consequences become inevitable, out of humanity’s
control.
Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets present the danger of
change with consequences that are irreversible on time scales
important to society [1]. These ice sheets required millennia to
grow to their present sizes. If ice sheet disintegration reaches a
point such that the dynamics and momentum of the process take
over, at that point reducing greenhouse gases may be unable to
prevent major ice sheet mass loss, sea level rise of many meters,
and worldwide loss of coastal cities – a consequence that is
irreversible for practical purposes. Interactions between the ocean
and ice sheets are particularly important in determining ice sheet
changes, as a warming ocean can melt the ice shelves, the tongues
of ice that extend from the ice sheets into the ocean and buttress
the large land-based ice sheets [92,202–203]. Paleoclimate data for
sea level change indicate that sea level changed at rates of the
order of a meter per century [81–83], even at times when the
forcings driving climate change were far weaker than the human-
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made forcing. Thus, because ocean warming is persistent for
centuries, there is a danger that large irreversible change could be
initiated by excessive ocean warming.
Paleoclimate data are not as helpful for defining the likely rate of
sea level rise in coming decades, because there is no known case of
growth of a positive (warming) climate forcing as rapid as the
anthropogenic change. The potential for unstable ice sheet
disintegration is controversial, with opinion varying from likely
stability of even the (marine) West Antarctic ice sheet [94] to likely
rapid non-linear response extending up to multi-meter sea level
rise [97–98]. Data for the modern rate of annual ice sheet mass
changes indicate an accelerating rate of mass loss consistent with a
mass loss doubling time of a decade or less (Fig. 10). However, we
do not know the functional form of ice sheet response to a large
persistent climate forcing. Longer records are needed for empirical
assessment of this ostensibly nonlinear behavior.
Greenhouse gas amounts in the atmosphere, most importantly
CO2 and CH4, change in response to climate change, i.e., as a
feedback, in addition to the immediate gas changes from human-
caused emissions. As the ocean warms, for example, it releases
CO2 to the atmosphere, with one principal mechanism being the
simple fact that the solubility of CO2 decreases as the water
temperature rises [204]. We also include in the category of slow
feedbacks the global warming spikes, or ‘‘hyperthermals’’, that
have occurred a number of times in Earth’s history during the
course of slower global warming trends. The mechanisms behind
these hyperthermals are poorly understood, as discussed below,
but they are characterized by the injection into the surface climate
system of a large amount of carbon in the form of CH4 and/or
CO2 on the time scale of a millennium [205–207]. The average
rate of injection of carbon into the climate system during these
hyperthermals was slower than the present human-made injection
of fossil fuel carbon, yet it was faster than the time scale for
removal of carbon from the surface reservoirs via the weathering
process [3,208], which is tens to hundreds of thousands of years.
Methane hydrates – methane molecules trapped in frozen water
molecule cages in tundra and on continental shelves – and organic
matter such as peat locked in frozen soils (permafrost) are likely
mechanisms in the past hyperthermals, and they provide another
climate feedback with the potential to amplify global warming if
large scale thawing occurs [209–210]. Paleoclimate data reveal
instances of rapid global warming, as much as 5–6uC, as a sudden
additional warming spike during a longer period of gradual
warming [see Text S1]. The candidates for the carbon injected
into the climate system during those warmings are methane
hydrates on continental shelves destabilized by sea floor warming
[211] and carbon released from frozen soils [212]. As for the
present, there are reports of methane release from thawing
permafrost on land [213] and from sea-bed methane hydrate
deposits [214], but amounts so far are small and the data are
snapshots that do not prove that there is as yet a temporal increase
of emissions.
Figure 9. Simulated global temperature relative to 1880–1920 mean for CO2 scenarios of Figure 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g009
Figure 10. Annual Greenland and West Antarctic ice mass changes as estimated via alternative methods. Data were read from Figure 4
of Shepherd et al. [23] and averaged over the available records.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g010
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There is a possibility of rapid methane hydrate or permafrost
emissions in response to warming, but that risk is largely
unquantified [215]. The time needed to destabilize large methane
hydrate deposits in deep sediments is likely millennia [215].
Smaller but still large methane hydrate amounts below shallow
waters as in the Arctic Ocean are more vulnerable; the methane
may oxidize to CO2 in the water, but it will still add to the long-
term burden of CO2 in the carbon cycle. Terrestrial permafrost
emissions of CH4 and CO2 likely can occur on a time scale of a
few decades to several centuries if global warming continues [215].
These time scales are within the lifetime of anthropogenic CO2,
and thus these feedbacks must be considered in estimating the
dangerous level of global warming. Because human-made
warming is more rapid than natural long-term warmings in the
past, there is concern that methane hydrate or peat feedbacks
could be more rapid than the feedbacks that exist in the
paleoclimate record.
Climate model studies and empirical analyses of paleoclimate
data can provide estimates of the amplification of climate
sensitivity caused by slow feedbacks, excluding the singular
mechanisms that caused the hyperthermal events. Model studies
for climate change between the Holocene and the Pliocene, when
Earth was about 3uC warmer, find that slow feedbacks due to
changes of ice sheets and vegetation cover amplified the fast
feedback climate response by 30–50% [216]. These same slow
feedbacks are estimated to amplify climate sensitivity by almost a
factor of two for the climate change between the Holocene and the
nearly ice-free climate state that existed 35 million years ago [54].
Implication for Carbon Emissions Target
Evidence presented under Climate Impacts above makes clear
that 2uC global warming would have consequences that can be
described as disastrous. Multiple studies [12,198,201] show that
the warming would be very long lasting. The paleoclimate record
and changes underway in the Arctic and on the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets with only today’s warming imply that sea level
rise of several meters could be expected. Increased climate
extremes, already apparent at 0.8uC warming [46], would be
more severe. Coral reefs and associated species, already stressed
with current conditions [40], would be decimated by increased
acidification, temperature and sea level rise. More generally,
humanity and nature, the modern world as we know it, is adapted
to the Holocene climate that has existed more than 10,000 years.
Warming of 1uC relative to 1880–1920 keeps global temperature
close to the Holocene range, but warming of 2uC, to at least the
Eemian level, could cause major dislocations for civilization.
However, distinctions between pathways aimed at ,1uC and
2uC warming are much greater and more fundamental than the
numbers 1uC and 2uC themselves might suggest. These funda-
mental distinctions make scenarios with 2uC or more global
warming far more dangerous; so dangerous, we suggest, that
aiming for the 2uC pathway would be foolhardy.
First, most climate simulations, including ours above and those
of IPCC [1], do not include slow feedbacks such as reduction of ice
sheet size with global warming or release of greenhouse gases from
thawing tundra. These exclusions are reasonable for a ,1uC
scenario, because global temperature barely rises out of the
Holocene range and then begins to subside. In contrast, global
warming of 2uC or more is likely to bring slow feedbacks into play.
Indeed, it is slow feedbacks that cause long-term climate sensitivity
to be high in the empirical paleoclimate record [51–52]. The
lifetime of fossil fuel CO2 in the climate system is so long that it
must be assumed that these slow feedbacks will occur if
temperature rises well above the Holocene range.
Second, scenarios with 2uC or more warming necessarily imply
expansion of fossil fuels into sources that are harder to get at,
requiring greater energy using extraction techniques that are
increasingly invasive, destructive and polluting. Fossil fuel
emissions through 2012 total ,370 GtC (Fig. 2). If subsequent
emissions decrease 6%/year, additional emissions are ,130 GtC,
for a total ,500 GtC fossil fuel emissions. This 130 GtC can be
obtained mainly from the easily extracted conventional oil and gas
reserves (Fig. 2), with coal use rapidly phased out and unconven-
tional fossil fuels left in the ground. In contrast, 2uC scenarios have
total emissions of the order of 1000 GtC. The required additional
fossil fuels will involve exploitation of tar sands, tar shale,
hydrofracking for oil and gas, coal mining, drilling in the Arctic,
Amazon, deep ocean, and other remote regions, and possibly
exploitation of methane hydrates. Thus 2uC scenarios result in
more CO2 per unit useable energy, release of substantial CH4 via
the mining process and gas transportation, and release of CO2 and
other gases via destruction of forest ‘‘overburden’’ to extract
subterranean fossil fuels.
Third, with our ,1uC scenario it is more likely that the
biosphere and soil will be able to sequester a substantial portion of
the anthropogenic fossil fuel CO2 carbon than in the case of 2uC
or more global warming. Empirical data for the CO2 ‘‘airborne
fraction’’, the ratio of observed atmospheric CO2 increase divided
by fossil fuel CO2 emissions, show that almost half of the emissions
is being taken up by surface (terrestrial and ocean) carbon
reservoirs [187], despite a substantial but poorly measured
contribution of anthropogenic land use (deforestation and
agriculture) to airborne CO2 [179,216]. Indeed, uptake of CO2
by surface reservoirs has at least kept pace with the rapid growth of
emissions [187]. Increased uptake in the past decade may be a
consequence of a reduced rate of deforestation [217] and
fertilization of the biosphere by atmospheric CO2 and nitrogen
deposition [187]. With the stable climate of the ,1uC scenario it is
plausible that major efforts in reforestation and improved
agricultural practices [15,173,175–177], with appropriate support
provided to developing countries, could take up an amount of
carbon comparable to the 100 GtC in our ,1uC scenario. On the
other hand, with warming of 2uC or more, carbon cycle feedbacks
are expected to lead to substantial additional atmospheric CO2
[218–219], perhaps even making the Amazon rainforest a source
of CO2 [219–220].
Fourth, a scenario that slows and then reverses global warming
makes it possible to reduce other greenhouse gases by reducing
their sources [75,221]. The most important of these gases is CH4,
whose reduction in turn reduces tropospheric O3 and stratospheric
H2O. In contrast, chemistry modeling and paleoclimate records
[222] show that trace gases increase with global warming, making
it unlikely that overall atmospheric CH4 will decrease even if a
decrease is achieved in anthropogenic CH4 sources. Reduction of
the amount of atmospheric CH4 and related gases is needed to
counterbalance expected forcing from increasing N2O and
decreasing sulfate aerosols.
Now let us compare the 1uC (500 GtC fossil fuel emissions) and
the 2uC (1000 GtC fossil fuel emissions) scenarios. Global
temperature in 2100 would be close to 1uC in the 500 GtC
scenario, and it is less than 1uC if 100 GtC uptake of carbon by the
biosphere and soil is achieved via improved agricultural and
forestry practices (Fig. 9). In contrast, the 1000 GtC scenario,
although nominally designed to yield a fast-feedback climate
response of , 2uC, would yield a larger eventual warming because
of slow feedbacks, probably at least 3uC.
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Danger of Uncontrollable Consequences
Inertia of the climate system reduces the near-term impact of
human-made climate forcings, but that inertia is not necessarily
our friend. One implication of the inertia is that climate impacts
‘‘in the pipeline’’ may be much greater than the impacts that we
presently observe. Slow climate feedbacks add further danger of
climate change running out of humanity’s control. The response
time of these slow feedbacks is uncertain, but there is evidence that
some of these feedbacks already are underway, at least to a minor
degree. Paleoclimate data show that on century and millennial
time scales the slow feedbacks are predominately amplifying
feedbacks.
The inertia of energy system infrastructure, i.e., the time
required to replace fossil fuel energy systems, will make it
exceedingly difficult to avoid a level of atmospheric CO2 that
would eventually have highly undesirable consequences. The
danger of uncontrollable and irreversible consequences necessarily
raises the question of whether it is feasible to extract CO2 from the
atmosphere on a large enough scale to affect climate change.
Carbon Extraction
We have shown that extraordinarily rapid emission reductions
are needed to stay close to the 1uC scenario. In absence of
extraordinary actions, it is likely that growing climate disruptions
will lead to a surge of interest in ‘‘geo-engineering’’ designed to
minimize human-made climate change [223]. Such efforts must
remove atmospheric CO2, if they are to address direct CO2 effects
such as ocean acidification as well as climate change. Schemes
such as adding sulfuric acid aerosols to the stratosphere to reflect
sunlight [224], an attempt to mask one pollutant with another, is a
temporary band-aid for a problem that will last for millennia;
besides it fails to address ocean acidification and may have other
unintended consequences [225].
Potential for Carbon Extraction
At present there are no proven technologies capable of large-
scale air capture of CO2. It has been suggested that, with strong
research and development support and industrial scale pilot
projects sustained over decades, costs as low as ,$500/tC may be
achievable [226]. Thermodynamic constraints [227] suggest that
this cost estimate may be low. An assessment by the American
Physical Society [228] argues that the lowest currently achievable
cost, using existing approaches, is much greater ($600/tCO2 or
$2200/tC).
The cost of capturing 50 ppm of CO2, at $500/tC (,$135/
tCO2), is ,$50 trillion (1 ppm CO2 is ,2.12 GtC), but more than
$200 trillion for the price estimate of the American Physical
Society study. Moreover, the resulting atmospheric CO2 reduction
will ultimately be less than 50 ppm for the reasons discussed
above. For example, let us consider the scenario of Fig. 5B in
which emissions continue to increase until 2030 before decreasing
at 5%/year – this scenario yields atmospheric CO2 of 410 ppm in
2100. Using our carbon cycle model we calculate that if we extract
100 ppm of CO2 from the air over the period 2030–2100
(10/7 ppm per year), say storing that CO2 in carbonate bricks, the
atmospheric CO2 amount in 2100 will be reduced 52 ppm to
358 ppm, i.e., the reduction of airborne CO2 is about half of the
amount extracted from the air and stored. The estimated cost of
this 52 ppm CO2 reduction is $100–400 trillion.
The cost of CO2 capture and storage conceivably may decline
in the future. Yet the practicality of carrying out such a program
with alacrity in response to a climate emergency is dubious. Thus
it may be appropriate to add a CO2 removal cost to the current
price of fossil fuels, which would both reduce ongoing emissions
and provide resources for future cleanup.
Responsibility for Carbon Extraction
We focus on fossil fuel carbon, because of its long lifetime in the
carbon cycle. Reversing the effects of deforestation is also
important and there will need to be incentives to achieve increased
carbon storage in the biosphere and soil, but the crucial
requirement now is to limit the amount of fossil fuel carbon in
the air.
The high cost of carbon extraction naturally raises the question
of responsibility for excess fossil fuel CO2 in the air. China has the
largest CO2 emissions today (Fig. 11A), but the global warming
effect is closely proportional to cumulative emissions [190]. The
United States is responsible for about one-quarter of cumulative
emissions, with China next at about 10% (Fig. 11B). Cumulative
responsibilities change rather slowly (compare Fig. 10 of 190).
Estimated per capita emissions (Fig. 12) are based on population
estimates for 2009–2011.
Various formulae might be devised to assign costs of CO2 air
capture, should removal prove essential for maintaining acceptable
climate. For the sake of estimating the potential cost, let us assume
that it proves necessary to extract 100 ppm of CO2 (yielding a
reduction of airborne CO2 of about 50 ppm) and let us assign each
country the responsibility to clean up its fraction of cumulative
emissions. Assuming a cost of $500/tC (,$135/tCO2) yields a cost
of $28 trillion for the United States, about $90,000 per individual.
Costs would be slightly higher for a UK citizen, but less for other
nations (Fig. 12B).
Cost of CO2 capture might decline, but the cost estimate used is
more than a factor of four smaller than estimated by the American
Physical Society [228] and 50 ppm is only a moderate reduction.
The cost should also include safe permanent disposal of the
captured CO2, which is a substantial mass. For the sake of scaling
the task, note that one GtC, made into carbonate bricks, would
produce the volume of ,3000 Empire State buildings or ,1200
Great Pyramids of Giza. Thus the 26 ppm assigned to the United
States, if made into carbonate bricks, would be equivalent to the
stone in 165,000 Empire State buildings or 66,000 Great Pyramids
of Giza. This is not intended as a practical suggestion: carbonate
bricks are not a good building material, and the transport and
construction costs would be additional.
The point of this graphic detail is to make clear the magnitude
of the cleanup task and potential costs, if fossil fuel emissions
continue unabated. More useful and economic ways of removing
CO2 may be devised with the incentive of a sufficient carbon price.
For example, a stream of pure CO2 becomes available for capture
and storage if biomass is used as the fuel for power plants or as
feedstock for production of liquid hydrocarbon fuels. Such clean
energy schemes and improved agricultural and forestry practices
are likely to be more economic than direct air capture of CO2, but
they must be carefully designed to minimize undesirable impacts
and the amount of CO2 that can be extracted on the time scale of
decades will be limited, thus emphasizing the need to limit the
magnitude of the cleanup task.
Policy Implications
Human-made climate change concerns physical sciences, but
leads to implications for policy and politics. Conclusions from the
physical sciences, such as the rapidity with which emissions must
be reduced to avoid obviously unacceptable consequences and the
long lag between emissions and consequences, lead to implications
in social sciences, including economics, law and ethics. Intergov-
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ernmental climate assessments [1,14] purposely are not policy
prescriptive. Yet there is also merit in analysis and discussion of the
full topic through the objective lens of science, i.e., ‘‘connecting the
dots’’ all the way to policy implications.
Energy and Carbon Pathways: A Fork in the Road
The industrial revolution began with wood being replaced by
coal as the primary energy source. Coal provided more
concentrated energy, and thus was more mobile and effective.
We show data for the United States (Fig. 13) because of the
availability of a long data record that includes wood [229]. More
limited global records yield a similar picture [Fig. 14], the largest
difference being global coal now at ,30% compared with ,20%
in the United States. Economic progress and wealth generation
were further spurred in the twentieth century by expansion into
liquid and gaseous fossil fuels, oil and gas being transported and
burned more readily than coal. Only in the latter part of the
twentieth century did it become clear that long-lived combustion
products from fossil fuels posed a global climate threat, as formally
acknowledged in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change [6]. However, efforts to slow emissions of the principal
atmospheric gas driving climate change, CO2, have been
ineffectual so far (Fig. 1).
Consequently, at present, as the most easily extracted oil and
gas reserves are being depleted, we stand at a fork in the road to
our energy and carbon future. Will we now feed our energy needs
by pursuing difficult to extract fossil fuels, or will we pursue energy
policies that phase out carbon emissions, moving on to the post
fossil fuel era as rapidly as practical?
This is not the first fork encountered. Most nations agreed to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 [6]. Imagine
if a bloc of countries favoring action had agreed on a common
gradually rising carbon fee collected within each of country at
domestic mines and ports of entry. Such nations might place
equivalent border duties on products from nations not having a
carbon fee and they could rebate fees to their domestic industry for
export products to nations without an equivalent carbon fee. The
legality of such a border tax adjustment under international trade
law is untested, but is considered to be plausibly consistent with
trade principles [230]. As the carbon fee gradually rose and as
additional nations, for their own benefit, joined this bloc of
nations, development of carbon-free energies and energy efficiency
would have been spurred. If the carbon fee had begun in 1995, we
Figure 11. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions. (A) 2012 emissions by source region, and (B) cumulative 1751–2012 emissions. Results are an update of Fig.
10 of [190] using data from [5].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g011
Figure 12. Per capita fossil fuel CO2 emissions. Countries, regions and data sources are the same as in Fig. 11. Horizontal lines are the global
mean and multiples of the global mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g012
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calculate that global emissions would have needed to decline
2.1%/year to limit cumulative fossil fuel emissions to 500 GtC. A
start date of 2005 would have required a reduction of 3.5%/year
for the same result.
The task faced today is more difficult. Emissions reduction of
6%/year and 100 GtC storage in the biosphere and soils are
needed to get CO2 back to 350 ppm, the approximate require-
ment for restoring the planet’s energy balance and stabilizing
climate this century. Such a pathway is exceedingly difficult to
achieve, given the current widespread absence of policies to drive
rapid movement to carbon-free energies and the lifetime of energy
infrastructure in place.
Yet we suggest that a pathway is still conceivable that could
restore planetary energy balance on the century time scale. That
path requires policies that spur technology development and
provide economic incentives for consumers and businesses such
that social tipping points are reached where consumers move
rapidly to energy conservation and low carbon energies. Moderate
overshoot of required atmospheric CO2 levels can possibly be
counteracted via incentives for actions that more-or-less naturally
sequester carbon. Developed countries, responsible for most of the
excess CO2 in the air, might finance extensive efforts in developing
countries to sequester carbon in the soil and in forest regrowth on
marginal lands as described above. Burning sustainably designed
biofuels in power plants, with the CO2 captured and sequestered,
would also help draw down atmospheric CO2. This pathway
would need to be taken soon, as the magnitude of such carbon
extractions is likely limited and thus not a solution to unfettered
fossil fuel use.
The alternative pathway, which the world seems to be on now,
is continued extraction of all fossil fuels, including development of
unconventional fossil fuels such as tar sands, tar shale, hydro-
fracking to extract oil and gas, and exploitation of methane
hydrates. If that path (with 2%/year growth) continues for 20
years and is then followed by 3%/year emission reduction from
2033 to 2150, we find that fossil fuel emissions in 2150 would total
1022 GtC. Extraction of the excess CO2 from the air in this case
would be very expensive and perhaps implausible, and warming of
the ocean and resulting climate impacts would be practically
irreversible.
Economic Implications: Need for a Carbon Fee
The implication is that the world must move rapidly to carbon-
free energies and energy efficiency, leaving most remaining fossil
fuels in the ground, if climate is to be kept close to the Holocene
range and climate disasters averted. Is rapid change possible?
Figure 13. United States energy consumption [229].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g013
Figure 14. World energy consumption for indicated fuels, which excludes wood [4].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.g014
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The potential for rapid change can be shown by examples. A
basic requirement for phasing down fossil fuel emissions is
abundant carbon-free electricity, which is the most rapidly
growing form of energy and also has the potential to provide
energy for transportation and heating of buildings. In one decade
(1977–1987), France increased its nuclear power production 15-
fold, with the nuclear portion of its electricity increasing from 8%
to 70% [231]. In one decade (2001–2011) Germany increased the
non-hydroelectric renewable energy portion of its electricity from
4% to 19%, with fossil fuels decreasing from 63% to 61%
(hydroelectric decreased from 4% to 3% and nuclear power
decreased from 29% to 18%) [231].
Given the huge task of replacing fossil fuels, contributions are
surely required from energy efficiency, renewable energies, and
nuclear power, with the mix depending on local preferences.
Renewable energy and nuclear power have been limited in part by
technical challenges. Nuclear power faces persistent concerns
about safety, nuclear waste, and potential weapons proliferation,
despite past contributions to mortality prevention and climate
change mitigation [232]. Most renewable energies tap diffuse
intermittent sources often at a distance from the user population,
thus requiring large-scale energy storage and transport. Develop-
ing technologies can ameliorate these issues, as discussed below.
However, apparent cost is the constraint that prevents nuclear and
renewable energies from fully supplanting fossil fuel electricity
generation.
Transition to a post-fossil fuel world of clean energies will not
occur as long as fossil fuels appear to the investor and consumer to
be the cheapest energy. Fossil fuels are cheap only because they do
not pay their costs to society and receive large direct and indirect
subsidies [233]. Air and water pollution from fossil fuel extraction
and use have high costs in human health, food production, and
natural ecosystems, killing more than 1,000,000 people per year
and affecting the health of billions of people [232,234], with costs
borne by the public. Costs of climate change and ocean
acidification, already substantial and expected to grow consider-
ably [26,235], also are borne by the public, especially by young
people and future generations.
Thus the essential underlying policy, albeit not sufficient, is for
emissions of CO2 to come with a price that allows these costs to be
internalized within the economics of energy use. Because so much
energy is used through expensive capital stock, the price should
rise in a predictable way to enable people and businesses to
efficiently adjust lifestyles and investments to minimize costs.
Reasons for preference of a carbon fee or tax over cap-and-trade
include the former’s simplicity and relative ease of becoming
global [236]. A near-global carbon tax might be achieved, e.g., via
a bi-lateral agreement between China and the United States, the
greatest emitters, with a border duty imposed on products from
nations without a carbon tax, which would provide a strong
incentive for other nations to impose an equivalent carbon tax.
The suggestion of a carbon fee collected from fossil fuel companies
with all revenues distributed to the public on a per capita basis
[237] has received at least limited support [238].
Economic analyses indicate that a carbon price fully incorpo-
rating environmental and climate damage would be high [239].
The cost of climate change is uncertain to a factor of 10 or more
and could be as high as ,$1000/tCO2 [235,240]. While the
imposition of such a high price on carbon emissions is outside the
realm of short-term political feasibility, a price of that magnitude is
not required to engender a large change in emissions trajectory.
An economic analysis indicates that a tax beginning at $15/
tCO2 and rising $10/tCO2 each year would reduce emissions in
the U.S. by 30% within 10 years [241]. Such a reduction is more
than 10 times as great as the carbon content of tar sands oil carried
by the proposed Keystone XL pipeline (830,000 barrels/day)
[242]. Reduced oil demand would be nearly six times the pipeline
capacity [241], thus the carbon fee is far more effective than the
proposed pipeline.
A rising carbon fee is the sine qua non for fossil fuel phase out, but
not enough by itself. Investment is needed in RD&D (research,
development and demonstration) to help renewable energies and
nuclear power overcome obstacles limiting their contributions.
Intermittency of solar and wind power can be alleviated with
advances in energy storage, low-loss smart electric grids, and
electrical vehicles interacting with the grid. Most of today’s nuclear
power plants have half-century-old technology with light-water
reactors [243] utilizing less than 1% of the energy in the nuclear
fuel and leaving unused fuel as long-lived nuclear ‘‘waste’’
requiring sequestration for millennia. Modern light-water reactors
can employ convective cooling to eliminate the need for external
cooling in the event of an anomaly such as an earthquake.
However, the long-term future of nuclear power will employ ‘‘fast’’
reactors, which utilize ,99% of the nuclear fuel and can ‘‘burn’’
nuclear waste and excess weapons material [243]. It should be
possible to reduce the cost of nuclear power via modular standard
reactor design, but governments need to provide a regulatory
environment that supports timely construction of approved
designs. RD&D on carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology
is needed, especially given our conclusion that the current
atmospheric CO2 level is already in the dangerous zone, but
continuing issues with CCS technology [7,244] make it inappro-
priate to construct fossil fuel power plants with a promise of future
retrofit for carbon capture. Governments should support energy
planning for housing and transportation, energy and carbon
efficiency requirements for buildings, vehicles and other manu-
factured products, and climate mitigation and adaptation in
undeveloped countries.
Economic efficiency would be improved by a rising carbon fee.
Energy efficiency and alternative low-carbon and no-carbon
energies should be allowed to compete on an equal footing,
without subsidies, and the public and business community should
be made aware that the fee will continually rise. The fee for
unconventional fossil fuels, such as oil from tar sands and gas from
hydrofracking, should include carbon released in mining and
refining processes, e.g., methane leakage in hydrofracking [245–
249]. If the carbon fee rises continually and predictably, the
resulting energy transformations should generate many jobs, a
welcome benefit for nations still suffering from long-standing
economic recession. Economic modeling shows that about 60% of
the public, especially low-income people, would receive more
money via a per capita 100% dispersal of the collected fee than
they would pay because of increased prices [241].
Fairness: Intergenerational Justice and Human Rights
Relevant fundamentals of climate science are clear. The
physical climate system has great inertia, which is due especially
to the thermal inertia of the ocean, the time required for ice sheets
to respond to global warming, and the longevity of fossil fuel CO2
in the surface carbon reservoirs (atmosphere, ocean, and
biosphere). This inertia implies that there is additional climate
change ‘‘in the pipeline’’ even without further change of
atmospheric composition. Climate system inertia also means that,
if large-scale climate change is allowed to occur, it will be
exceedingly long-lived, lasting for many centuries.
One implication is the likelihood of intergenerational effects,
with young people and future generations inheriting a situation in
which grave consequences are assured, practically out of their
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control, but not of their doing. The possibility of such intergen-
erational injustice is not remote – it is at our doorstep now. We
have a planetary climate crisis that requires urgent change to our
energy and carbon pathway to avoid dangerous consequences for
young people and other life on Earth.
Yet governments and industry are rushing into expanded use of
fossil fuels, including unconventional fossil fuels such as tar sands,
tar shale, shale gas extracted by hydrofracking, and methane
hydrates. How can this course be unfolding despite knowledge of
climate consequences and evidence that a rising carbon price
would be economically efficient and reduce demand for fossil
fuels? A case has been made that the absence of effective
governmental leadership is related to the effect of special interests
on policy, as well as to public relations efforts by organizations that
profit from the public’s addiction to fossil fuels [237,250].
The judicial branch of governments may be less subject to
pressures from special financial interests than the executive and
legislative branches, and the courts are expected to protect the
rights of all people, including the less powerful. The concept that
the atmosphere is a public trust [251], that today’s adults must
deliver to their children and future generations an atmosphere as
beneficial as the one they received, is the basis for a lawsuit [252]
in which it is argued that the U.S. government is obligated to
protect the atmosphere from harmful greenhouse gases.
Independent of this specific lawsuit, we suggest that intergen-
erational justice in this matter derives from fundamental rights of
equality and justice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
[253] declares ‘‘All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.’’
Further, to consider a specific example, the United States
Constitution provides all citizens ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’
and states that no person can be deprived of ‘‘life, liberty or
property without due process of law’’. These fundamental rights
are a basis for young people to expect fairness and justice in a
matter as essential as the condition of the planet they will inhabit.
We do not prescribe the legal arguments by which these rights can
be achieved, but we maintain that failure of governments to
effectively address climate change infringes on fundamental rights
of young people.
Ultimately, however, human-made climate change is more a
matter of morality than a legal issue. Broad public support is
probably needed to achieve the changes needed to phase out fossil
fuel emissions. As with the issue of slavery and civil rights, public
recognition of the moral dimensions of human-made climate
change may be needed to stir the public’s conscience to the point
of action.
A scenario is conceivable in which growing evidence of climate
change and recognition of implications for young people lead to
massive public support for action. Influential industry leaders,
aware of the moral issue, may join the campaign to phase out
emissions, with more business leaders becoming supportive as they
recognize the merits of a rising price on carbon. Given the relative
ease with which a flat carbon price can be made international
[236], a rapid global emissions phasedown is feasible. As fossil fuels
are made to pay their costs to society, energy efficiency and clean
energies may reach tipping points and begin to be rapidly adopted.
Our analysis shows that a set of actions exists with a good
chance of averting ‘‘dangerous’’ climate change, if the actions
begin now. However, we also show that time is running out.
Unless a human ‘‘tipping point’’ is reached soon, with implemen-
tation of effective policy actions, large irreversible climate changes
will become unavoidable. Our parent’s generation did not know
that their energy use would harm future generations and other life
on the planet. If we do not change our course, we can only pretend
that we did not know.
Discussion
We conclude that an appropriate target is to keep global
temperature within or close to the temperature range in the
Holocene, the interglacial period in which civilization developed.
With warming of 0.8uC in the past century, Earth is just emerging
from that range, implying that we need to restore the planet’s
energy balance and curb further warming. A limit of approx-
imately 500 GtC on cumulative fossil fuel emissions, accompanied
by a net storage of 100 GtC in the biosphere and soil, could keep
global temperature close to the Holocene range, assuming that the
net future forcing change from other factors is small. The longevity
of global warming (Fig. 9) and the implausibility of removing the
warming if it is once allowed to penetrate the deep ocean
emphasize the urgency of slowing emissions so as to stay close to
the 500 GtC target.
Fossil fuel emissions of 1000 GtC, sometimes associated with a
2uC global warming target, would be expected to cause large
climate change with disastrous consequences. The eventual
warming from 1000 GtC fossil fuel emissions likely would reach
well over 2uC, for several reasons. With such emissions and
temperature tendency, other trace greenhouse gases including
methane and nitrous oxide would be expected to increase, adding
to the effect of CO2. The global warming and shifting climate
zones would make it less likely that a substantial increase in forest
and soil carbon could be achieved. Paleoclimate data indicate that
slow feedbacks would substantially amplify the 2uC global
warming. It is clear that pushing global climate far outside the
Holocene range is inherently dangerous and foolhardy.
The fifth IPCC assessment Summary for Policymakers [14]
concludes that to achieve a 50% chance of keeping global
warming below 2uC equivalent CO2 emissions should not exceed
1210 GtC, and after accounting for non-CO2 climate forcings this
limit on CO2 emissions becomes 840 GtC. The existing drafts of
the fifth IPCC assessment are not yet approved for comparison
and citation, but the IPCC assessment is consistent with studies of
Meinshausen et al. [254] and Allen et al. [13], hereafter M2009
and A2009, with which we can make comparisons. We will also
compare our conclusions with those of McKibben [255]. M2009
and A2009 appear together in the same journal with the two lead
authors on each paper being co-authors on the other paper.
McKibben [255], published in a popular magazine, uses
quantitative results of M2009 to conclude that most remaining
fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground, if global warming this
century is to be kept below 2uC. McKibben [255] has been very
successful in drawing public attention to the urgency of rapidly
phasing down fossil fuel emissions.
M2009 use a simplified carbon cycle and climate model to make
a large ensemble of simulations in which principal uncertainties in
the carbon cycle, radiative forcings, and climate response are
allowed to vary, thus yielding a probability distribution for global
warming as a function of time throughout the 21st century. M2009
use this distribution to infer a limit on total (fossil fuel+net land use)
carbon emissions in the period 2000–2049 if global warming in the
21st century is to be kept below 2uC at some specified probability.
For example, they conclude that the limit on total 2000–2049
carbon emissions is 1440 GtCO2 (393 GtC) to achieve a 50%
chance that 21st century global warming will not exceed 2uC.
A2009 also use a large ensemble of model runs, varying
uncertain parameters, and conclude that total (fossil fuel+net land
use) carbon emissions of 1000 GtC would most likely yield a peak
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CO2-induced warming of 2uC, with 90% confidence that the peak
warming would be in the range 1.3–3.9uC. They note that their
results are consistent with those of M2009, as the A2009 scenarios
that yield 2uC warming have 400–500 GtC emissions during
2000–2049; M2009 find 393 GtC emissions for 2uC warming, but
M2009 included a net warming effect of non-CO2 forcings, while
A2009 neglected non-CO2 forcings.
McKibben [255] uses results of M2009 to infer allowable fossil
fuel emissions up to 2050 if there is to be an 80% chance that
maximum warming in the 21st century will not exceed 2uC above
the pre-industrial level. M2009 conclude that staying under this
2uC limit with 80% probability requires that 2000–2049 emissions
must be limited to 656 GtCO2 (179 GtC) for 2007–2049.
McKibben [255] used this M2009 result to determine a remaining
carbon budget (at a time not specified exactly) of 565 GtCO2 (154
GtC) if warming is to stay under 2uC. Let us update this analysis to
the present: fossil fuel emissions in 2007–2012 were 51 GtC [5], so,
assuming no net emissions from land use in these few years, the
M2009 study implies that the remaining budget at the beginning
of 2013 was 128 GtC.
Thus, coincidentally, the McKibben [255] approach via M2009
yields almost exactly the same remaining carbon budget (128 GtC)
as our analysis (130 GtC). However, our budget is that required to
limit warming to about 1uC (there is a temporary maximum
during this century at about 1.1–1.2uC, Fig. 9), while McKibben
[255] is allowing global warming to reach 2uC, which we have
concluded would be a disaster scenario! This apparently vast
difference arises from three major factors.
First, we assumed that reforestation and improved agricultural
and forestry practices can suck up the net land use carbon of the
past. We estimate net land use emissions as 100 GtC, while M2009
have land use emissions almost twice that large (,180 GtC). We
argue elsewhere (see section 14 in Supporting Information of [54])
that the commonly employed net land use estimates [256] are
about a factor of two larger than the net land use carbon that is
most consistent with observed CO2 history. However, we need not
resolve that long-standing controversy here. The point is that, to
make the M2009 study equivalent to ours, negative land use
emissions must be included in the 21st century equal to earlier
positive land use emissions.
Second, we have assumed that future net change of non-CO2
forcings will be zero, while M2009 have included significant non-
CO2 forcings. In recent years non-CO2 GHGs have provided
about 20% of the increase of total GHG climate forcing.
Third, our calculations are for a single fast-feedback equilibrium
climate sensitivity, 3uC for doubled CO2, which we infer from
paleoclimate data. M2009 use a range of climate sensitivities to
compute a probability distribution function for expected warming,
and then McKibben [255] selects the carbon emission limit that
keeps 80% of the probability distribution below 2uC.
The third factor is a matter of methodology, but one to be borne
in mind. Regarding the first two factors, it may be argued that our
scenario is optimistic. That is true, but both goals, extracting 100
GtC from the atmosphere via improved forestry and agricultural
practices (with possibly some assistance from CCS technology) and
limiting additional net change of non-CO2 forcings to zero, are
feasible and probably much easier than the principal task of
limiting additional fossil fuel emissions to 130 GtC.
We noted above that reforestation and improving agricultural
and forestry practices that store more carbon in the soil make sense
for other reasons. Also that task is made easier by the excess CO2
in the air today, which causes vegetation to take up CO2 more
efficiently. Indeed, this may be the reason that net land use
emissions seem to be less than is often assumed.
As for the non-CO2 forcings, it is noteworthy that greenhouse
gases controlled by the Montreal Protocol are now decreasing, and
recent agreement has been achieved to use the Montreal Protocol
to phase out production of some additional greenhouse gases even
though those gases do not affect the ozone layer. The most
important non-CO2 forcing is methane, whose increases in turn
cause tropospheric ozone and stratospheric water vapor to
increase. Fossil fuel use is probably the largest source of methane
[1], so if fossil fuel use begins to be phased down, there is good
basis to anticipate that all three of these greenhouse gases could
decrease, because of the approximate 10-year lifetime of methane.
As for fossil fuel CO2 emissions, considering the large, long-lived
fossil fuel infrastructure in place, the science is telling us that policy
should be set to reduce emissions as rapidly as possible. The most
fundamental implication is the need for an across-the-board rising
fee on fossil fuel emissions in order to allow true free market
competition from non-fossil energy sources. We note that
biospheric storage should not be allowed to offset further fossil
fuel emissions. Most fossil fuel carbon will remain in the climate
system more than 100,000 years, so it is essential to limit the
emission of fossil fuel carbon. It will be necessary to have incentives
to restore biospheric carbon, but these must be accompanied by
decreased fossil fuel emissions.
A crucial point to note is that the three tasks [limiting fossil fuel
CO2 emissions, limiting (and reversing) land use emissions,
limiting (and reversing) growth of non-CO2 forcings] are
interactive and reinforcing. In mathematical terms, the problem
is non-linear. As one of these climate forcings increases, it increases
the others. The good news is that, as one of them decreases, it
tends to decrease the others. In order to bestow upon future
generations a planet like the one we received, we need to win on
all three counts, and by far the most important is rapid phasedown
of fossil fuel emissions.
It is distressing that, despite the clarity and imminence of the
danger of continued high fossil fuel emissions, governments
continue to allow and even encourage pursuit of ever more fossil
fuels. Recognition of this reality and perceptions of what is
‘‘politically feasible’’ may partially account for acceptance of
targets for global warming and carbon emissions that are well into
the range of ‘‘dangerous human-made interference’’ with climate.
Although there is merit in simply chronicling what is happening,
there is still opportunity for humanity to exercise free will. Thus
our objective is to define what the science indicates is needed, not
to assess political feasibility. Further, it is not obvious to us that
there are physical or economic limitations that prohibit fossil fuel
emission targets far lower than 1000 GtC, even targets closer to
500 GtC. Indeed, we suggest that rapid transition off fossil fuels
would have numerous near-term and long-term social benefits,
including improved human health and outstanding potential for
job creation.
A world summit on climate change will be held at United
Nations Headquarters in September 2014 as a preliminary to
negotiation of a new climate treaty in Paris in late 2015. If this
treaty is analogous to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol [257], based on
national targets for emission reductions and cap-and-trade-with-
offsets emissions trading mechanisms, climate deterioration and
gross intergenerational injustice will be practically guaranteed.
The palpable danger that such an approach is conceivable is
suggested by examination of proposed climate policies of even the
most forward-looking of nations. Norway, which along with the
other Scandinavian countries has been among the most ambitious
and successful of all nations in reducing its emissions, nevertheless
approves expanded oil drilling in the Arctic and development of
tar sands as a majority owner of Statoil [258–259]. Emissions
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foreseen by the Energy Perspectives of Statoil [259], if they occur,
would approach or exceed 1000 GtC and cause dramatic climate
change that would run out of control of future generations. If, in
contrast, leading nations agree in 2015 to have internal rising fees
on carbon with border duties on products from nations without a
carbon fee, a foundation would be established for phaseover to
carbon free energies and stable climate.
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